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INTRODUCTION 
Children with disabilities are entitled to a free, appropriate public education 
(FAPE), including placement at residential programs when necessary.1 In some 
cases, school districts offer such placements. In other cases, parents are forced to 
turn to the courts. Families of sufficient means also have the additional option of 
funding the placement on their own and seeking reimbursement. When are youth 
with mental illness entitled to residential placement through the education system? 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),2 all children 
are entitled to a FAPE in a placement that is the least restrictive environment 
(LRE).3 This placement is determined through an individualized educational 
program (IEP).4 If a child has a disability that prevents him or her from access to 
education, then a FAPE consists of the support and services necessary to assist 
the child in accessing education along with appropriate placement.5 In cases where 
a child’s mental health condition impedes his or her access to education, a FAPE 
includes the mental health services the student requires to access education.6 
Children with mental illness can present a variety of internalizing or 
externalizing behaviors that impact their education.7 Like all other related support 
and services in special education, schools must provide mental health services in a 
placement that is the LRE.8 “To the maximum extent appropriate,” children with 
disabilities should be educated in regular classes with their nondisabled peers in a 
 
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
2. Id. § 1400. 
3. Id. § 1412(a)(5). 
4. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i). 
5. Id. §§ 1401(9), (26), (29), 1412(a)(1)(A). 
6. IDEA and its implementing regulations do not use the term mental health services. 
Nonetheless, many related services are mental health services. E.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.34(a) (2014) 
(related services include psychological services, counseling services, and rehabilitation counseling); id. 
§ 300.34(c)(2) (counseling services); id. § 300.34(c)(8) (parent counseling and training); id. 
§ 300.34(c)(10) (psychological services); id. § 300.34(c)(14) (social work services); id. § 300.104 
(residential placement). 
7. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 13 (5th ed. 2013) (clustering disorders based on internalizing and externalizing factors). 
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
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comprehensive school.9 Some children’s behavioral challenges are severe enough 
that they must attend intensive day treatment programs while continuing to live at 
home.10 But the only way to enable a child with severe mental health challenges to 
access his or her education is through an educational placement at a residential 
program.11 
Broadly speaking, a residential program is a placement at which a child is 
placed away from his or her home—whether it is an educational placement is the 
core question in most cases.12 In some cases, the student may need to leave his or 
her home state to attend school at a residential program,13 while in others the 
student is able to—or even entitled to—placement closer to his or her home.14 
Every residential program is different,15 and a particular residential program may 
not be appropriate for a particular child.16 
School districts often resist placing youth at residential programs.17 
Residential placements are costly compared to even the most expensive nonpublic 
day schools and are among the most restrictive educational placements available.18 
 
9. Id. 
10. E.g., Tracy N. ex rel. Nickalas N. v. Dep’t of Educ., Haw., 715 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1114–15 
(D. Haw. 2010) (finding a day treatment program appropriate for a large youth with frequent 
behavioral outbursts). 
11. E.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1497–98, 1502–03 (9th Cir. 
1996) (finding that where the child’s assaultive behavior problems had escalated to the point of the 
child’s requiring restraints, a period of hospitalization, and ultimately expulsion from the school’s day 
program, such that no educational services were provided for six months, the hearing officer and 
district court properly ordered residential placement through an IEP). 
12. E.g., id. at 1501 (noting that the child required “intensive, round-the-clock care, in order to 
address [a student’s] behavioral disabilities and enable her to benefit from her education”). While 
IDEA’s implementing regulations require that parents not be assigned the nonmedical costs, 
including room and board, of a residential program when such placement is necessary, 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.104 (2014), neither IDEA nor its implementing regulations define what a residential program 
actually is. 
13. E.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 82 F.3d at 1496–98 (Washington student parentally placed in a 
residential program in Montana). 
14. E.g., Todd D. ex rel. Robert D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1578–79, 1581–82 (11th Cir. 
1991) (holding the district court was incorrect in ordering a Georgia youth to attend a residential 
program in Texas when his IEP goals required placement closer to home). 
15. E.g., Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 639 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (while there was “no dispute that Michelle require[d] a residential placement in order to 
receive an appropriate education,” the parents and school district were unable to identify a mutually 
agreeable residential program); Clevenger ex rel. Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 515–
16 (6th Cir. 1984) (comparing two residential programs to determine which was appropriate). 
16. E.g., Eschenasy ex rel. Eschenasy v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 604 F. Supp. 2d 639, 651–52 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a particular residential program was not appropriate where the child did 
not make progress academically and was asked to leave because of behavioral challenges). 
17. IDEA refers to local educational agencies. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A) (2012). Local 
educational agencies can include, inter alia, school districts, county offices of education, and 
independently operated charter schools. Id. This Article refers to local educational agencies 
collectively as school districts throughout. 
18. E.g., Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that 
the objective LRE’s preference for mainstreaming precludes placement in a residential educational 
program if the student could access an education in a day program); Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 903 F.2d 
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When the student who needs residential placement is in the foster care or youth 
probation system, this resistance is often augmented by questions—feigned or 
real—of residence and responsibility.19 
This Article explores the landscape of cases regarding residential programs.20 
It is intended to serve as a practitioner’s guide to understanding application of 
IDEA and the right of children with disabilities to a FAPE. First, it briefly 
discusses what it means to guarantee a FAPE in the LRE under the requirements 
of IDEA, before turning to who is responsible for providing it. Next, it reviews 
what IDEA means by “educational benefit,”21 previewing how courts’ frequent 
disregard of the statute’s text has led to much of the confusion in the current state 
of the law. The Article then explores several key areas of confusion within the law, 
with a particular focus on the statute’s “medical exception,” before setting out the 
core tests utilized by the various circuit courts of appeals to determine whether 
placement at a residential program is appropriate. After this, the Article briefly 
discusses unilateral placements by parents and their attempts to seek 
reimbursement from the appropriate educational agency. 
When read closely, case law regarding residential programs is riddled with 
inconsistencies, conflations, and contradictions.22 But when read as a whole, the 
body of law is similar if not uniform across circuits so long as appropriate 
attention is paid to the semantics of each circuit’s wording of the inquiry—with 
the notable exception of the Tenth Circuit. For the most part, cases requesting 
residential placement for a FAPE are reliable in unilateral placement cases and 
vice versa. 
I. TOMMY 
Tommy23 struggled all his life in school despite being in special education 
since first grade. He has depression and severe, school-based anxiety, the latter of 
which may stem from his intellectual disability that went unidentified until he was 
seventeen.24 For a decade, California schools passed Tommy from grade to grade 
 
at 635, 639 (the placement sought by parents in 1985 was $150,000 per year); Residential Treatment 
Centers, MD. COAL. FAMILIES FOR CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH, www.mdcoalition.org/
resources/childrens-mental-health/155-residential-treatment-centers (last visited Aug. 25, 2014). In 
the author’s experience, yearly costs at various residential programs between 2007 and 2014 have 
ranged from $120,000 to $150,000. 
19. E.g., Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1053–55 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (five years of litigation to determine what agencies were responsible for the educational 
placement of a foster youth in a residential program). 
20. As originally conceived, this Article focused particularly on residential placements for 
court-involved youth. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part V. 
23. “Tommy’s” story is based on a former client of the author. Some facts were changed to 
maintain confidentiality. 
24. Until recently, intellectual disabilities were called “mental retardation.” Compare AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 
2000) (mental retardation), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 7, at 33 (intellectual disability). In 
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and failed to identify his mild-bordering-on-moderate intellectual disability. As he 
grew older, he began presenting behavioral challenges as a result of his disabilities. 
In sixth grade, he started acting out in class. In seventh grade, he was regularly 
being suspended. And in eighth grade, he was expelled from school for a fight. 
Tommy did not succeed in comprehensive public schools. His school district 
offered placement in a private school that serves only children with disabilities 
through his IEP. 
But Tommy’s behaviors worsened in severity and frequency over the course 
of the first semester. He was increasingly sullen and would rarely speak either at 
home or at school. He made no friends and developed no meaningful 
relationships with any school staff. Some weeks he sat quietly in the back of the 
room doing nothing, while other weeks he swore at teachers and threatened his 
classmates. By the spring, he could rarely sleep through an entire night due to 
night terrors and experienced anxiety attacks during the school day. He began 
skipping school altogether. His private school documented all of these issues and 
discussed them with the school district at multiple IEP team meetings, but neither 
proposed any services or accommodations to address Tommy’s deteriorating 
mental health and its impact on his education. His mother repeatedly asked for 
help and finally a mental health evaluation confirmed his severe depression and 
anxiety and recommended educational placement in a residential program. The 
school district did not act on this recommendation for over four months. 
While the school district did nothing, Tommy’s behaviors continued to 
escalate. An off-campus altercation led to Tommy’s arrest and detention in a 
juvenile hall. A school psychologist at the juvenile hall evaluated Tommy and 
identified his intellectual disability and behaviors consistent with diagnoses of 
bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder. She confirmed that he needed placement in 
a residential program in order to access his education. The county agency 
operating the juvenile hall’s school adopted that recommendation at an IEP team 
meeting. The director of special education from his home district participated in 
that meeting and did not dispute the IEP placement. 
The residential placement was made four years after Tommy’s mental health 
began to impede his access to an education and nearly a year after a school-based 
mental health evaluation recommended residential placement. 
Tommy thrived at his residential program. His behaviors first stabilized with 
continual prompting. Then he began acquiring positive replacement behaviors and 
relied decreasingly on adult prompts. He made academic progress for the first 
time since elementary school. But it was several thousand miles from home. The 
school district refused to convene IEP team meetings and the county only funded 
one trip for his mother to visit him and participate in in-person family counseling 
 
anticipation of this change, Congress accordingly amended IDEA in 2010 to refer to intellectual 
disabilities. Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, § 2(b)(2), 124 Stat. 2643, 2643 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. 1400 (2012)). 
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to help her understand his IEP and his developmental and mental health needs. 
Although his emotional functioning improved, due to his cognitive deficits he did 
not understand why he was in a locked placement so far from home. 
About nine months into placement, his behavior began to deteriorate. 
Placement staff suggested that Tommy was ready to step down to a less restrictive 
setting closer to home, but that he still would need a residential program to access 
an education. His school district now claimed that the juvenile court had placed 
Tommy there outside the IEP process, even though their director of special 
education had attended the underlying IEP. They disavowed all responsibility and 
cynically offered to convene an IEP team meeting to offer him placement as soon 
as he returned home but not before. The juvenile court still maintained 
jurisdiction and indicated that he would likely be redetained if he returned home 
before an appropriate placement was arranged. 
Informal attempts to resolve the dispute and bring Tommy home failed. 
Counsel filed an administrative due process complaint,25 engaged in extensive 
motion practice, and the case finally settled before hearing. The district agreed to 
transition Tommy to an unlocked residential program less than twenty miles from 
his mother’s home. He completed high school there and enrolled in a vocational 
program to build further independence skills. 
Tommy is like the dozens of children for whom the author has obtained 
residential placement, whose emotional and behavioral needs are ignored until the 
only recourse is among the most restrictive and expensive. This Article does not 
address the myriad school-based services that should be provided to address a 
child’s mental health and behavioral needs prior to reaching the point Tommy did. 
Instead, it focuses on the law once a child’s disabling condition reaches that point 
of extraordinary impact. 
II. IDEA GUARANTEES A FAPE IN THE LRE FOR  
ALL CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
The core guarantee of the IDEA is the right to a free, appropriate public 
education in the least restrictive environment—a FAPE in the LRE—through an 
individualized educational program (IEP).26 The term “IEP” generally appears in 
four different contexts in special education. An IEP can refer to a written 
description of a disabled child’s unique program of special education and related 
services.27 The IEP is also the specific program that (should) enable the child to 
 
25. IDEA requires states to afford an “impartial due process hearing” process to resolve 
disputes between parents and school districts. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f )(1). In the author’s experience, this 
is generally referred to as a “due process” hearing or an “administrative due process hearing.” The 
hearing process includes the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to present, 
confront, and compel the attendance of witnesses. Id. § 1415(h). Such a hearing is the primary method 
for exhausting administrative remedies prior to filing in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2). 
26. Id. § 1401(9). 
27. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A). 
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access an education. An “IEP team” is a group of stakeholders—parents, teachers, 
service providers—who meet to review and modify the IEP as necessary.28 The 
“IEP meeting,” or “IEP team meeting,” is the meeting at which the IEP is 
developed or modified.29 In most cases, to establish the appropriateness of a 
residential program a child must first be evaluated by a school district, found 
eligible for special education, and be offered an IEP. 
A. Eligibility for Special Education 
To determine whether a child is eligible for special education, educational 
agencies must identify children who may have disabilities.30 After this, educational 
agencies must evaluate such children in all areas of known and suspected 
disability.31 Evaluations must then be administered by staff who are both trained 
and knowledgeable in evaluating children with disabilities and also capable of 
obtaining, integrating, and interpreting existing data.32 IEP teams must then 
consider relevant assessment data to create an IEP that meets the full extent of the 
student’s academic, developmental, and functional needs.33 
Most students who are placed at residential programs are eligible for special 
education when they suffer from a “serious emotional disturbance.”34 But there is 
no requirement for a particular classification in order to access a residential 
program.35 Eligibility for emotional disturbance is based on long-term 
functioning36: a single episode does not establish eligibility nor does a brief 
remission obviate eligibility. 
 
28. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). 
29. E.g., id. § 1414(d)(3)(A), (E). 
30. Id. § 1412(a)(3). In the author’s experience, though IDEA places the child-find duty on the 
state educational agency, in most instances that duty is delegated to the local educational agency. 
31. Id. § 1414(b)(3)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(4) (2014). 
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.34(c)(10), 304(b)(1), (c)(1)(iv), (c)(6). 
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1), (d)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(1)(ii)–(iv). 
34. E.g., Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ. of the E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 
145 F.3d 95, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1998); N. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 138 (D.D.C. 1979). A 
serious emotional disturbance is a condition that occurs over a long period, to a marked degree, and 
that adversely affects the child’s educational performance. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i). In addition to 
those three criteria, a child must exhibit at least one of the following: 
 An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors; 
 An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and 
teachers; 
 Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances; 
 A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or 
 A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school 
problems. 
Id. § 300.8(c)(4)(i)(A)–(E). A child does not have an emotional disturbance if he or she is “socially 
maladjusted” unless it is determined that he or she nonetheless has an emotional disturbance. Id. at 
(c)(4)(ii). 
35. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(B) (clarifying that the child-find duty does not require 
classification by disability so long as every child with a disability is offered the special education and 
related services he or she needs to access his or her education). 
36. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i). 
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A district cannot deny eligibility for special education by focusing only on a 
youth’s high functioning at a residential program.37 In a case from the Second 
Circuit, Treena Muller was adopted from an orphanage and began exhibiting 
behavioral and emotional problems early in life.38 After the third psychiatric 
hospitalization in two months, she was discharged to a residential program where 
she “responded well, both emotionally and academically.”39 Treena’s school 
district evaluated her for the first time three months into this residential 
placement.40 The district dismissed Treena’s long history of behavioral and 
emotional problems as a mere “tendency for depression.”41 Instead, it focused 
solely on her high level of functioning within the residential program and found 
her ineligible for special education altogether.42 The Second Circuit found that 
Treena’s long history of behavioral and emotional problems “amounted to more 
than a mere conduct disorder.”43 
A district also cannot deny eligibility by viewing behaviors in isolation. 
Treena’s behaviors included “suicide attempts, . . . arson attempts, . . . lies, cutting 
classes, failure to complete homework, stealing things, quitting the basketball 
team, . . . defiance, poor grades and academic performance.”44 Many of these 
behaviors “are not unusual or ‘inappropriate’ by themselves,” but in combination 
they established that she exhibited inappropriate behaviors under normal 
circumstances.45 
B. Determining the Procedural and Substantive Adequacy of an IEP Under Rowley 
Courts still apply the following two-pronged test from Rowley to determine 
whether school districts provide a FAPE under IDEA46: (1) whether the 
respondents complied with the procedures set forth in IDEA, and (2) whether the 
 
37. Muller, 145 F.3d at 103–04. 
38. Id. at 98. 
39. Id. at 99. 
40. Id. at 98–99. 
41. Id. at 99. 
42. Id. at 99–100. 
43. Id. at 103–04. 
44. Id. at 104 (quoting the underlying district court decision). 
45. Id. 
46. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits federally funded programs from 
discriminating on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). Public schools comply with section 
504 by providing a FAPE through reasonable accommodations to their educational programming. 
E.g., Lauren G. ex rel. Scott G. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387–88 (E.D. Pa. 
2012). Generally, courts have found “few differences” between IDEA’s affirmative duty to provide a 
FAPE and section 504’s prohibition against discrimination. Id. (quoting and discussing Third Circuit 
precedent on the relationship between IDEA and section 504). In the author’s experience, because 
IDEA’s procedures are voluminously set out in statute and regulation, many education advocates 
exclusively prosecute claims through IDEA. This Article only addresses IDEA, but note that in some 
cases, the lack of procedures in section 504 results in greater protection to children with disabilities 
than IDEA. Id. at 392–94 (holding that for parents’ failures to comply with procedures, student was 
denied a FAPE for one month under IDEA and entitled to no relief, but was denied a FAPE for five 
months and entitled to some relief under section 504 for the same conduct). 
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IEP was uniquely tailored and reasonably calculated to provide the child with 
some educational benefit.47 These prongs are usually referred to as procedural 
FAPE and substantive FAPE, respectively.48 
Amy Rowley was a Deaf elementary student who had above average 
cognitive ability.49 Amy’s parents wanted her school district to provide a sign 
language interpreter, but the district instead provided only an FM transmitter 
linked to a hearing aid.50 While Amy passed easily from grade to grade and was an 
above-average student, she had the potential to do much better.51 Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for a divided court, held that IDEA does not require IEPs to 
maximize the potential of children with disabilities commensurate with the 
opportunities afforded to their non-disabled peers, “[r]ather, Congress sought 
primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with 
access to a free public education.”52 
A procedural error only results in a denial of a FAPE if it: (1) impedes the 
right to a FAPE; (2) significantly impedes parental participation; or (3) causes a 
deprivation of educational benefit.53 For example, failure to have a formal written 
offer of a FAPE at the beginning of the school year is a procedural violation of 
IDEA, but it does not cause a denial of a FAPE if it does not cause harm because 
the parents know what the offer is, had already decided to reject it, and received 
the written offer just a few days later.54 But a FAPE has been denied when there 
was a failure to disclose testing results indicating a diagnosis of autism, because 
without knowledge of those results, the child’s parents could not meaningfully 
participate in the IEP process.55 
In assessing whether an IEP provides a substantive a FAPE, courts engage 
in a fact-intensive inquiry, including academic progress, progress toward annual 
 
47. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982). 
48. E.g., Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985) (holding that, to 
comply with IDEA, local educational agencies “implement the substantive and procedural 
requirements of the Act” (citation omitted)). 
49. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184. 
50. Id. at 184–85. 
51. Id. at 185–86. 
52. Id. at 200. 
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2012). Congress codified the Second Circuit’s three-prong 
harmless-error approach when it reauthorized IDEA in 2004. Id. In the immediate wake of Rowley, 
Circuits diverged in their interpretation of whether to evaluate procedural FAPE under a strict liability 
theory—that a procedural violation alone established a denial of a FAPE—or a harmless-error test. 
Compare Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985) (strict liability 
for procedural violations), with Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994–95 (1st Cir. 
1990) (applying a three-prong harmless-error test), and W.G. ex rel. R.G. v. Bd of Tr., 960 F.2d 1479, 
1484 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying a two prong harmless error test), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 
1414(d)(1)(B), as recognized in Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P. ex rel. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 
2012). Though it has been a decade since Congress codified the harmless-error test, in the author’s 
experience, some attorneys still occasionally plead procedural violations on a strict-liability theory. 
And their clients lose on those claims every time. 
54. J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 459–61 (9th Cir. 2010). 
55. Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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goals, and access to the general curriculum.56 Schools are not required to 
maximize educational benefit, but only to offer a “basic floor” of educational 
opportunity.57 
As described below in Section II.B, courts analyzing residential placements 
do not usually engage in this standard FAPE analysis. In unilateral placement 
cases, courts often use this analysis in the first prong, evaluating the district’s offer 
of a FAPE, but they do not strictly apply it in the second prong analyzing the 
appropriateness of the parents’ placement. 
C. The Least Restrictive Environment—the Objective and the Subjective 
Least restrictive environment (LRE) has two meanings in IDEA. Though 
neither the statute nor case law refer to the distinction in this way, the two 
meanings are best understood as the objective LRE and the subjective LRE. 
The objective LRE refers to the continuum of placements, starting with full-
time placement in a general education program with nondisabled peers—literally 
the least restrictive environment—and continuing up to the most restrictive 
environments, namely hospitals and institutions.58 Residential programs are not 
expressly described on the federal continuum, but are instead separately defined in 
the regulations.59 Residential programs fall near or at the most restrictive end of 
the LRE continuum.60 
The subjective LRE refers to IDEA’s core mandate that children with 
disabilities be removed from the general population “only when the nature or 
severity of the disability” is such that the child cannot access an education.61 
Circuits use one of three tests to determine the subjective LRE. The Fifth Circuit 
developed the two-prong Daniel R.R. test,62 which the Second, Third, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits also use.63 The Sixth Circuit developed the three-prong Roncker 
 
56. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200–01. 
57. Id. at 215. 
58. 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2014). 
59. Id. § 300.104. 
60. See, e.g., Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that 
the objective LRE’s preference for mainstreaming precludes placement in a residential educational 
program if the student could access an education in a day program). 
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012). 
62. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989). 
63. P. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(adopting the Daniel R.R., 847 F.2d at 1046, test, but incorrectly identifying the Ninth Circuit as 
following that test); L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 976 (10th Cir. 2004); Oberti ex 
rel. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer ex rel. Greer v. Rome City Sch. 
Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991), opinion withdrawn, 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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test,64 which the Fourth and Eighth Circuits also use.65 The Ninth Circuit alone 
uses its four-prong Rachel H. test.66 
This Article does not further discuss the different LRE tests. While 
residential placement cases often mention LRE,67 courts do not usually apply an 
LRE analysis to determine whether residential placement is appropriate. 
D. Related Services 
An appropriate education must include mental health services when those 
services are necessary for a student to benefit from his or her education.68 
Federally mandated educationally related mental-health services, among other 
things, include: counseling services by social workers, psychologists, counselors, 
and other qualified personnel; medical services for assessment and evaluation; 
parent counseling and training; psychological services; planning and case 
management; and rehabilitation counseling.69 However, IDEA and its 
implementing regulations “clearly convey[ ] that the list of services in § 300.34 is 
not exhaustive.”70 
E. Non-Medical Residential Programs 
Since its enactment in 1975 as the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act, IDEA and its implementing regulations have always required that educational 
agencies place children in residential programs when that is required to provide 
educational benefit71: if placement in a public or private residential program is 
necessary to provide special education and related services to a handicapped child, 
 
64. Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). 
65. DeVries ex rel. DeBlaay v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878–79 (4th Cir. 1989); 
A.W. ex rel. N.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987). 
66. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H. ex rel. Holland, 14 F.3d 
1398, 1400–01, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). 
67. E.g., Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 1993); Kruelle v. New 
Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695 (3d Cir. 1981). 
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (2012). 
69. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(2) (2014) (counseling services); id. § 300.34(c)(5) (medical services 
for assessment and evaluation); id. § 300.34(c)(8) (parent counseling and training); id. § 300.34 
(c)(10)(i–ii) (psychological services); id. § 300.34(c)(10)(v) (planning and case management); id. § 
300.34(c)(12) (rehabilitation counseling). 
70. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants 
for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,569 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. 
pts. 300–01) [hereinafter Assistance to States] (responding to comments requesting a clear statement 
that the list of related services is not exhaustive). 
71. Different authorities cite different starting points for IDEA. For example, Forest Grove Sch. 
Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009), looks to the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970. From 
1965 to 1975, Congress engaged in a series of legislative attempts to address educational access for 
children with disabilities culminating in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Bd. 
of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179–80 (1982) (discussing the early history of federal 
special education litigation and legislation). The author follows a majority in pointing to the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 as the genesis of IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1405–06, 1415–20. 
That was the first codification that substantially resembles IDEA as it exists today. 
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the program, including non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost 
to the parents of the child.72 
The only change to that mandate is to place greater emphasis on the person 
by updating the reference from “handicapped child” to “child with a disability.”73 
But as discussed more in Section VI below, the real question is when residential 
placement is necessary to enable a child to access his or her education. 
III. COURTS’ APPROACHES TO ACADEMIC AND FUNCTIONAL NEEDS 
The core guarantee of IDEA is a FAPE—free, appropriate public education. 
But what is an education? Is it just instruction in academic areas like reading, 
writing, and arithmetic? The plain language of IDEA is clear: measurement of 
educational benefit includes both academic and functional performance. In 
developing an IEP, the IEP team “shall consider . . . the academic, developmental, 
and functional needs of the child.”74 
Following the text of IDEA, special education evaluations must “use a 
variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, 
developmental, and academic information.”75 Evaluation materials must be 
provided and administered in the way “most likely to yield accurate information 
on what the child knows and can do academically, developmentally, and 
functionally.”76 Reevaluation is warranted whenever “the local educational agency 
determines that the educational or related services needs, including improved 
academic achievement and functional performance, of the child warrant a 
reevaluation.”77 Prior to exiting a child from special education, the local 
educational agency must provide the child a summary of his or her “academic 
achievement and functional performance.”78 Assistive technology is equipment 
“used to increase, maintain, or improve functional capabilities of a child with a 
disability.”79 An IEP document must include, among other things: a statement of 
“present levels of academic achievement and functional performance”;80 a 
statement of annual goals “including academic and functional goals”;81 and a 
description of the accommodations needed to “measure the academic 
achievement and functional performance.”82 
Where Congress intended to limit educational benefit to academic 
achievement, it did so specifically. IDEA does not limit educational benefit to 
 
72. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 692 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 121a.302 (1979)). 
73. 45 C.F.R. § 300.104. 
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A) (2012). 
75. Id. § 1414(b)(2)(A). 
76. Id. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
77. Id. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i). 
78. Id. § 1414(c)(5)(B)(ii). 
79. Id. § 1401(1). 
80. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I). 
81. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II). 
82. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VI)(aa). 
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academic achievement.83 Yet courts regularly disregard the plain language of 
IDEA, so the definition of educational benefit varies from circuit to circuit (and 
sometimes from case to case).84 For example, in the Ninth Circuit, educational 
benefit can include academic, social, and behavioral needs among others—
academic achievement tests are “not the sine qua non of ‘educational benefit.’”85 
But, when determining whether a residential placement is educational in nature, 
“educational” no longer includes “medical, social, or emotional problems . . . quite 
apart from the learning process.”86 
A. Standards for Reviewing Residential Placements 
The most difficult task in carefully parsing cases on residential programs is 
that courts conflate several distinctions in their analysis. These distinctions are not 
always vital, but courts’ lack of specificity does little to help clarify an already 
imprecise inquiry. 
Most importantly, courts often interchangeably apply cases involving 
disputes over whether a residential placement is necessary for a FAPE with 
unilateral placement cases.87 As used in this Article, a FAPE case is one in which 
the parent is advocating for the school district to place the child in a residential 
program through his or her IEP. The child is not yet in the desired placement and 
the core dispute is what educational program is necessary to provide a FAPE. A 
unilateral placement case is one in which a parent has withdrawn his or her child 
from public programs, placed the child at the parent’s own expense, and then 
seeks reimbursement from the educational agency. The child is already in the 
desired placement and, while what is necessary for FAPE is at issue, the core 
dispute is who will pay. 
This cross-referencing is further complicated, as described below in Section 
VI, by the Seventh and Fifth Circuits’ articulation of analyses that are nominally 
different from the majority approach but do not seem to be substantively much 
different than one another. Though placement and related services are two 
different things, many courts conflate them when discussing residential 
 
83. Though perhaps one could read the requirement for states to monitor “educational results 
and functional outcomes” as such a separation? See id. § 1416(a)(2)(A). 
84. See Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 855, 861–62, 864 (6th 
Cir. 2004); Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 1998); Polk ex rel. Polk v. 
Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 179 (2nd Cir. 1988). 
85. Seattle Sch. Dist., No.1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996). 
86. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
87. Compare e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 
2009) (quoting Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 903 F.2d at 643—a FAPE case—in deciding a unilateral 
placement case), with Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing In re 
Drew P. v. Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1989)—a unilateral placement case—in 
deciding a FAPE case). 
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programs.88 This leads to a second confusion when courts apply “the medical 
exception” as if it were a single doctrine as described below in Section IV. 
Courts next waver in the target of the medical exception analysis: some 
courts look to the purpose89 (i.e., what motivated the placement), where other 
courts look into the nature of the service and placement (i.e., what is being 
provided and by whom).90 As described below in Section VII, in unilateral cases 
courts may look to both. The standard of review at the district and appellate court 
levels is another moving target. This Article does not discuss it, but it is a vital 
consideration in determining whether to appeal an administrative decision. 
These challenges are all layered on IDEA’s necessarily subjective standard 
requiring that a child be afforded a FAPE in the LRE. This shifting landscape 
does not lend itself to clean categories and tests, regardless of what any given case 
professes. The root of these conflations and confusions seems to be a departure 
from the statutory text and purpose of IDEA, as described below in Sections V, 
VI, and VII. Nonetheless, this nuance also leaves room creatively for the zealous 
advocate who understands where there is firm ground in the law and where there 
is mush. 
IV. THE MEDICAL SERVICES EXEMPTIONS 
IDEA provides two similar but distinct relevant medical exceptions.91 The 
first medical exception is that “related services” include the medical services of a 
physician only for diagnostic and evaluation purposes.92 Any medical services for 
any reason other than diagnostic and evaluation purposes are not related services, 
and therefore not the responsibility of the school district.93 If a service is medical 
(and not for diagnosis or evaluation), the school is completely exempted from 
providing it.94 
The second medical exception is that educational agencies are responsible 
for all “non-medical” costs of residential program placements.95 In comments to 
the 2006 regulations, the Department of Education’s Office of Special Education 
and Related Services explained that this means that “visits to a doctor for 
 
88. See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1237 
(10th Cir. 2012) (“[B]oth courts which purport to adopt and courts which purport to break from the 
Third Circuit approach frequently conflate the two statutory provisions.” (citations omitted)). 
Elizabeth E. is discussed in detail below. 
89. E.g., Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir. 1981). 
90. E.g., Darlene L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
91. Additionally, related services do not include provision of surgically implanted devices. 34 
C.F.R. § 300.5 (2014). 
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(5). 
93. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro ex rel. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890 (1984) (noting the second 
issue was whether catheterization “is excluded from this definition [of related services] as a ‘medical 
servic[e]’ serving purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(26))). 
94. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26). 
95. 34 C.F.R. § 300.104. 
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treatment of medical conditions are not covered services under Part B of the Act 
and parents may be responsible for the cost of the medical care.”96 It was not 
written as a complete bar to such placements, but rather as a limitation of certain 
services.97 
The seminal Supreme Court case on the related services medical exception 
determined that catheterization was a related service where it could be performed 
by a lay person with minimal training and was necessary to enable the youth to 
attend school.98 Amber Tatro was born with spina bifida that, among other 
challenges, made her unable to void her bladder without catheterization every 
three to four hours.99 “The procedure is a simple one that may be performed in a 
few minutes by a layperson with less than an hour’s training. . . . [A]nd Amber 
[who was eight at the time of the decision] soon will be able to perform this 
procedure herself.”100 In preschool, her school district offered her an IEP but 
refused to offer catheterization.101 The Supreme Court set out a twofold inquiry: 
(1) Was the service a supportive service? (2) Was the service a medical service for 
purposes other than diagnosis and evaluation?102 
In finding that catheterization was a supportive service, the Court focused on 
IDEA’s purpose of making public schools available to children with disabilities.103 
The Court reasoned that services “that permit a child to remain at school during 
the day are no less related to the effort to educate than are services that enable the 
child to reach, enter, or exit the school.”104 
In finding that catheterization was not a medical service, the Court made 
three key determinations.105 The Court first determined that the regulatory 
definition of medical services as those provided by a physician was reasonable106 
and clarified that this clause exempted only services that must be provided by a 
physician.107 Catheterization was comparable to the nursing services provided to 
nondisabled students, such as on-site administration of medication.108 The Court 
next clarified that the school would not be required to provide a service that could 
be performed outside the school day while still enabling the child to attend 
 
96. Id. § 300.104; Assistance to States, supra note 70, at 46,581. 
97. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.104. 
98. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885, 894. 
99. Id. at 885. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 885–86. 
102. Id. at 890. 
103. Id. at 891. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 892–93. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 894. 
108. Id. at 893–94. 
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school.109 Finally, the Court noted that the family had sought no equipment from 
the school, only the services of qualified personnel.110 
A year before Tatro, an Illinois district court upheld a denial authorization for 
a facility on the grounds that the proposed placement was “a psychiatric hospital 
providing psychiatric services.”111 The plaintiffs urged that psychiatric services 
should be considered psychological services, and therefore “related services” 
under IDEA.112 But “[p]sychiatrists, in contradistinction to psychologists . . . are 
licensed physicians whose services are appropriately designated as medical 
treatment.”113 Psychiatric services (as opposed to psychological services) are still 
generally considered medical services that are exempted from IDEA. 
A month after Tatro, another Illinois district court allowed reimbursement 
for psychological services provided by a psychiatrist.114 That court focused on 
Tatro’s analysis of whether the service must be provided by a physician—including 
a psychiatrist.115 Because the therapy at issue was recommended (but not 
provided) by the school and could have been provided by a nonphysician, the 
therapy was a related service despite being provided by a psychiatrist, but 
reimbursement would be capped at the rate a non-psychiatrist would have 
charged.116 
Tatro and its early progeny focused on the nature of the service itself. If the 
service was not a supportive service—not required to enable the child to attend 
school—or needed to be provided by a physician, then it was an excluded medical 
service. The service’s purpose was never considered. 
V. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES 
State educational agencies are ultimately responsible for ensuring that every 
child with a disability has access to a FAPE.117 Generally states ensure availability 
of a FAPE by clearly delegating responsibility to local school districts and enabling 
those districts to provide a FAPE. But as described below, in limited 
circumstances state educational agencies are directly responsible for educating 
youth. 
A. Consolidating Responsibility 
The purpose of including responsibility for residential placements in IDEA 
and its implementing regulations was “to assure a single line of responsibility with 
 
109. Id. at 894. 
110. Id. at 895. 
111. Darlene L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
112. Id. at 1344. 
113. Id. 
114. Max M. v. Thompson, 592 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1445 (ordering reimbursement reduced commensurate with rate that would be 
charged by a non-psychiatrist mental health professional). 
117. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12) (2012). 
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regard to the education” of children with disabilities, and to ensure that “the State 
educational agency shall be the responsible agency” at the end of that line.118 
When it enacted IDEA, Congress was concerned that “in many States, 
responsibility [for services] is divided, depending upon the age of the handicapped 
child, sources of funding, and type of services delivered.”119 Congress created this 
single line of authority through state departments of education in an effort to 
prevent interagency disputes over services: 
Without this requirement, there is an abdication of responsibility for the 
education of handicapped children. . . . While the Committee understands 
that different agencies may, in fact, deliver services, the responsibility 
must remain in a central agency overseeing the education of handicapped 
children, so that failure to deliver services or the violation of the rights of 
handicapped children is squarely the responsibility of one agency.120 
Further, 
[a] cost-benefit philosophy supported these interlocking goals [of 
providing federal support for the education of children with disabilities]. 
Instead of saddling public agencies and taxpayers with the enormous 
expenditures necessary to maintain the handicapped as lifelong 
dependents in a minimally acceptable institutionalized existence, 
Congress reasoned that the early injection of federal money and provision 
of educational services would remove this burden by creating productive 
citizens.121 
For example, the Orange County Department of Education followed both 
the letter and the intent of IDEA in Orange County—discussed below in Section 
V.B—by placing the student in a residential facility and maintaining that 
placement while disputing responsibility.122 But in the author’s experience, it is 
rare for a school district to make such a placement if they have a remotely 
plausible argument against responsibility.123 The state education agency is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring that a FAPE—including placement at a 
residential program when necessary—is available to every child. 
 
118. North v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 139 (D.D.C. 1979) (quoting a comment to 
the original regulations to IDEA’s predecessor the EAHCA). 
119. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 24 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1448. See generally 
Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 691–93 (3d Cir. 1981) (for history cites). 
120. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 24. 
121. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 691 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-168). 
122. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011). 
123. Perhaps one reason for this is that California law prohibits school districts from filing for 
due process against one another. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7586 (West 2008). The district in this 
position can file against the student disclaiming responsibility. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2012); 34 
C.F.R. § 300.507 (2014). But if it has already placed the youth, it must maintain the placement through 
the pendency of the proceedings—stay put. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a). The author is 
aware of no case awarding a district reimbursement for maintaining stay put, even if the district is 
ultimately successful on the merits. 
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B. Direct Responsibility of the State Educational Agency 
The state educational agency becomes directly responsible to provide a 
FAPE to a particular child when it either expressly assumes direct responsibility or 
fails to ensure that a FAPE is available to all children. States expressly assume 
direct responsibility for providing a FAPE in limited circumstances. For example, 
the California Department of Education directly operates California Schools for 
the Deaf.124 Hawaii, an anomaly, places responsibility for providing a FAPE 
directly on the state department of education which acts as both the state 
educational agency and the statewide-local educational agency for all students.125 
When a state expressly assumes direct responsibility for providing a FAPE, it is in 
fact responsible.126 
Absent express responsibility, state educational agencies can become directly 
responsible for providing a FAPE by their action or inaction. When states fail to 
ensure that a FAPE is available to all children, they trigger direct state 
responsibility for a FAPE. This broadly occurs in two scenarios: when they do not 
clearly delegate responsibility,127 and when a local school district is unable or 
unwilling to serve a child with a disability,128 particularly when the state’s actions 
or inaction impedes the student’s right to a FAPE.129 
Sometimes states fail to clearly delegate responsibility to school districts and 
thus become directly responsible for providing a FAPE. For a number of years, 
California law did not establish what school district was responsible for foster 
youth placed through an IEP at a residential program.130 The student in Orange 
County, A.S., is a crossover youth—a foster youth who “crossed over” to the 
juvenile delinquency system—whose biological parents’ educational decision-
making rights had been terminated by a juvenile court.131 He had a foster parent 
who continued to hold educational rights even after he stopped living with her in 
2004.132 When his 2006 IEP team determined that he required a residential 
 
124. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 59002 (West 2003). 
125. Michael P. ex rel. Courtney G. v. Dep’t of Educ., 656 F.3d 1057, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2011). 
126. E.g., Parent ex rel. Student v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., Case No. OAH-2012030888, slip op. at 
11, ¶ 10 (Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings Apr. 25, 2013), available at www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah
/seho_decisions/2012030888.pdf (finding the California Department of Education “is the 
responsible public agency in a due process hearing involving a student attending” a school described 
in California Education Code section 59002). 
127. Doe ex rel. Gonzalez v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1491–93 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 
court may order a state to provide services directly to a disabled child where a local education agency 
has failed to do so), aff’d, Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 329 (1988); Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 
at 1063 (finding the state responsible for providing a FAPE when California law did not clearly 
delineate what district was responsible for a child). 
128. 34 C.F.R. § 300.227(a). 
129. Todd D. ex rel. Robert D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1578 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
where Georgia law and policy barred the school district from offering an appropriate educational 
placement, the state was directly responsible). 
130. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d at 1055, 1057. 
131. Id. at 1054. 
132. Id. 
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placement, the county office of education agreed to fund the placement but 
disputed responsibility, forcing A.S. to file for due process against that office, the 
state, and two other school districts.133 California law did not clarify what agency 
was responsible for A.S. until a 2007 amendment to the California Education 
Code—nearly a year and a half after his placement.134 Because California law failed 
to delegate responsibility for such students, the California Department of 
Education was directly responsible for providing A.S. a FAPE during that time.135 
States also become directly responsible for providing a FAPE when a local 
school district is unable or unwilling to serve a child with a disability. In the early 
1990s, Georgia law and policy effectively barred school districts from offering 
placement at in-state residential programs.136 Todd D. was an eighteen-year-old 
Georgia youth with schizophrenia and borderline intellectual disability whose 
parents declined a proposed placement in Texas, arguing in part that he should be 
closer to home to work on his transition goals.137 The district court ruled against 
the parents based on the convenience for the state of maintaining its existing 
policies.138 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this approach that ignored Todd’s 
unique needs.139 The state would be directly responsible to provide Todd a FAPE 
if his parents could prove on remand that state policy in fact prevented the district 
from serving Todd in a local program.140 
Similarly, an Illinois family recently survived a state education agency’s Rule 
12(b) motion to dismiss where they had alleged that the state’s refusal to approve 
the only placement appropriate for their child denied their child a FAPE.141 The 
plaintiffs credibly alleged that (1) but for the state’s failure to approve the only 
appropriate placement, the school district would have placed the child at that 
placement; and (2) there was no appropriate placement other than the one sought 
in the complaint.142 The court considered this a jurisdictional issue and couched its 
order in the language of traceability—whether the plaintiff could establish a causal 
link between the state’s action and the alleged harm.143 
But families are not always successful linking state action to denials of a 
 
133. Id. at 1054–55. 
134. Id. at 1060–63. 
135. Id. at 1063 (citing Gadsby ex rel. Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 953 (4th Cir.1997)) 
(holding that for the time period during which “California law failed to make any school district 
responsible for [the student’s] education . . . CDE [was] the agency responsible” for providing a 
FAPE). 
136. Todd D. ex rel. Robert D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1578–79 (11th Cir. 1991). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 1581–82. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1583. 
141. B.J. ex rel. B.J. v. Homewood Flossmoor CHSD #233, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1095 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013). 
142. Id. at 1097–98. 
143. Id. at 1095–96. 
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FAPE.144 At the administrative level, some hearing officers in cases basing a denial 
of a FAPE on the state’s failure to approve a program have found that a particular 
placement is inappropriate in part because it is not state approved.145 On appeal, 
courts then rule that the parent lacks standing to challenge the state’s withholding 
of approval because the denial of a FAPE is caused by the hearing officer’s 
decision.146 So the parent in this situation cannot win at the hearing because the 
hearing officer cannot award the relief they seek. But neither can the parent seek 
relief against the state because the denial is nominally caused by the hearing 
officer’s decision. This could be an instance in which a direct filing in state or 
federal court is appropriate on the grounds that exhaustion of administrative 
remedies would be futile.147 
The state educational agency may fail to ensure availability of a FAPE when 
it fails to resolve interagency disputes.148 Yet generally, states comply with IDEA 
by clearly delegating responsibility for providing a FAPE to local educational 
agencies—primarily school districts.149 
C. Responsibility Based on Students’ Residency Versus Parents’ Residency  
Responsibility for providing a FAPE to California students with disabilities 
usually follows the student. For students in traditional families, the school district 
 
144. E.g., M.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Waterville Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 185, 
189 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
145. As discussed below, state accreditation is not necessary to determine that a program is 
appropriate, but it is often a factor in such determinations. 
146. In some jurisdictions, a hearing officer’s decision that a placement was inappropriate 
prevents plaintiffs from establishing a causal link with the state department of education. M.M., 963 F. 
Supp. at 189; Yamen ex rel. Yamen v. Bd. of Educ. of Arlington Sch. Dist., 909 F. Supp. 207, 209–20 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
147. There is growing consensus among the circuits that exhaustion is an affirmative defense 
in special education cases, not a jurisdictional bar. See Payne ex rel. D.P. v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 
F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that “the exhaustion requirement in [20 U.S.C.] § 1415(l) 
[(2012)] is not jurisdictional”), overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 
2014) (holding that when exhaustion is raised as an affirmative defense, it should be decided on a 
motion for summary judgment, not on an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion); McQueen ex rel. 
McQueen v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 488 F.3d 868, 873 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), “casts doubt” on any characterization of exhaustion as jurisdictional); 
Mosley v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 434 F.3d 527, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding the exhaustion 
requirement in IDEA is a claims-processing rule). 
 These cases are based on a recent series of Supreme Court decisions holding that where, as in 
IDEA, a federal statute is silent as to whether exhaustion must be pleaded as an element of a claim, 
failure to exhaust is not a jurisdictional bar but rather an affirmative defense that must be raised and 
proved by the defendant. Jones, 549 U.S. at 212–13 (holding that because Prison Litigation Reform 
Act is silent, the usual federal practice of regarding exhaustion as an affirmative defense to be pleaded 
and demonstrated must be followed); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005) (reaffirming 
the holding of Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004), in which the Court admonished lower courts to 
carefully distinguish between jurisdictional and claims-processing rules). 
148. See Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 696–98 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(discussing the importance of a single line of responsibility to prevent such disputes from causing 
denials of service). 
149. Id. at 696. 
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in which a child resides with his or her parent(s) is responsible for that child’s 
education.150 When a youth is detained at a juvenile detention center, the county 
office of education in which the detention center is located is responsible 
regardless of where the youth came from.151 When a court places a foster youth in 
a group home or foster family home, the school district in which that home is 
located is responsible for educating the youth.152 If a noneducational public 
agency, including a juvenile court, makes a residential placement by itself outside 
the IEP process, then that noneducational public agency “shall be responsible for 
the residential costs and the cost of noneducation services of the individual,”153 
and if that residential placement is located within California, then the school 
district in which the placement is located becomes responsible for the child’s 
education.154 When a youth is placed in a hospital—including a psychiatric 
hospital—the school district in which the hospital is located is responsible.155 
There are several key exceptions to this general rule that responsibility 
follows the youth. First, California foster youth have the right to remain in their 
school of origin when a court-ordered (noneducational) placement would 
otherwise force them to change schools;156 the school district of the school of 
origin remains responsible for educating that foster youth.157 
Second, when a student requires an educational placement in an out-of-state 
state residential program, responsibility stays with the district in which the youth’s 
parent lives, regardless of the youth’s location.158 This responsibility continues 
even after the student turns eighteen.159 But a “parent” for special education 
purposes includes a court-appointed education rights holder, such as a court-
appointed special advocate.160 The result is that a school district that has never 
seen a child can be responsible for offering and funding a residential placement 
simply because some good Samaritan volunteered to help a child in need. 
Third, when a youth transfers from one California school district to another, 
 
150. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); id. § 56028 (West 2003 & Supp. 
2014); Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 553 (Ct. App. 
2004) (holding that Education Code “[s]ection 48200 embodies the general rule that parental 
residence dictates a pupil’s proper school district”). 
151. EDUC. § 48645.2 (West 2006). 
152. Id. § 48204 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014). 
153. Id. § 56159 (West 2003). 
154. Id. § 48204(a)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2014). 
155. Id. § 56167 (West 2003 & Supp. 2014). 
156. Id. § 48853.5(e) (West 2006 & Supp. 2014). 
157. Id. 
158. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“We hold as a matter of California law that the California agency responsible for funding a special 
education student’s education at an out-of-state residential program is the school district in which the 
student’s parent, as defined by California Education Code section 56028, resides.”). 
159. EDUC. § 56041 (West 2003) (stating that responsibility stays with the district of the 
parent for non-conserved youth and with the district of the conservator for conserved youth); Orange 
Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d at 1058–59 (explaining the application of section 56041). 
160. EDUC. § 56028(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2014). 
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during an academic year, while the youth is residentially placed through an IEP, 
and the new district does not have a contract with the residential facility, then the 
originating special education local plan area is responsible for maintaining the 
placement for the remainder of the academic year.161 Generally, when a youth 
transfers from one California district to another, the receiving district must offer 
comparable services for thirty days and then either adopt the previous IEP or 
develop, adopt, and implement a new IEP.162 
Fourth, if a noneducational public agency places a child in an out of state 
residential facility “without the involvement of the school district . . . in which the 
parent or guardian resides,” then that noneducational public agency is fully 
responsible for the costs of that placement, including the cost of any special 
education.163 
The availability of reimbursement for court placements as de facto unilateral 
placements is discussed below in Section VII. It is unclear whether these 
provisions would be a bar from seeking reimbursement from a school district if 
the placement was educationally necessary but made without the involvement of 
the district due to the district’s refusal to participate. 
D. Interdistrict Transfers 
How does a youth transfer districts while physically remaining in a residential 
program? Under California law, a youth does not legally “reside” at a residential 
program.164 So when the parent(s) move to the jurisdiction of another school 
district while the youth is still in placement, the youth has also changed legal 
residence, and thus transfers districts. Understanding transfer provisions is 
particularly important when representing court-involved youth in residential 
placements. 
First, when a detained California youth’s IEP team places the youth in a 
residential program, the youth likely immediately becomes a transfer student—by 
leaving the juvenile detention facility, the youth disenrolls from the juvenile court 
school.165 Children with disabilities in the juvenile-delinquency system retain their 
right to a FAPE.166 Because the youth never “resided” in the detention facility (for 
 
161. Id. § 56325(c). California local plans are created by special education local plan areas 
(SELPAs), which can be large districts or consortia of smaller districts. See id. § 56195.1. 
162. Id. § 56325(a). 
163. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7579(d) (West 2008). 
164. A California minor’s residence is determined by the parent with whom he or she 
maintains his or her abode. Id. § 244(d) (West 2012). The residence of an unmarried minor with a 
living parent cannot be changed by that minor’s own act. Id. § 244(e). An adult in California can only 
have one residence at a time, and one residence cannot be lost until another is gained. Id. § 244(b)–(c). 
Thus, a minor retains his or her parent’s residence because the minor does not maintain an abode in a 
residential program and cannot lose his or her parent’s residence absent an affirmative act by the 
parent. 
165. EDUC. § 48645.1 (West 2008). 
166. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(2) (2014) (limited exception to a FAPE for youth aged 18–21 
in adult correctional facilities). Youth in adult correctional facilities who were found eligible for special 
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the same reasons they do not reside at the residential program), the youth transfers 
from the county office of education back to the district in which the “parent” 
resides. The county office of education is responsible for maintaining the 
placement through the end of the academic year plus extended school year, and 
then the home district will be responsible for offering a FAPE.167 It is not clear 
how the interplay of the thirty-day transfer provisions and the requirement to have 
an IEP in effect at the beginning of a school year affects students in this situation. 
Second, whenever a student’s parent changes, then the youth will have 
transferred if the new parent lives in a different school district.168 While most 
students do not experience changes of parents, it is common for court-involved 
youth, particularly foster youth, to experience such changes of legal parent (for 
example, if the natural parents’ rights are terminated or a court-appointed special 
advocate resigns).169 
In sum, it is undisputed that educational agencies are responsible for 
residential placement when it is educationally necessary. And since the inception 
of IDEA, courts have struggled to determine when residential placement is 
educationally necessary. 
VI. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DETERMINING WHETHER A  
RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT IS NECESSARY 
Courts apply one of four tests to determine whether a residential placement 
is educationally necessary. A majority of circuits inquire whether the placement is 
“primarily educationally-based,” looking to whether the child’s educational needs 
are severable from his or her social, emotional, and medical needs.170 Nearly two 
decades of relatively consistent law among the courts of appeals later, the Seventh 
Circuit departed from this approach and instead chose to look to whether the 
services are “primarily oriented” toward academics, with what appears to be a 
narrow exception allowing functional skills to be considered for children with 
moderate to severe developmental disabilities.171 Another decade later, the Fifth 
Circuit created a test requiring courts to look at every element of a placement and 
“weed out” any unnecessary elements.172 After at least thirty-three years of 
litigation on residential placements, the Tenth Circuit took IDEA out of context 
 
education prior to their adult incarceration are entitled to special education and related services, but 
do not enjoy the full rights of other youth with disabilities. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 741 F.3d 
922, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2014) (under California law, the school district in which the youth legally resides 
is responsible for serving youth in adult correctional facilities). 
167. EDUC. § 56325(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2014). 
168. GOV’T § 244(d). 
169. E.g., Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 
2011) (holding that plaintiff’s biological parents’ rights were terminated and assigned to his foster 
parent). 
170. See infra Part VII.B. 
171. See infra Part VI. 
172. See id. 
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in purporting to take a pure textualist approach.173 As described below, this 
approach likely runs afoul of the text of IDEA and its implementing regulations. 
Despite inconsistencies, there still exists a large amount of consensus 
regarding approaches to residential program and unilateral placement cases. 
Residential program cases generally fall into one (or both) of two categories: either 
the family is seeking an offer of a FAPE at a residential program, or the family has 
unilaterally placed the child and is seeking reimbursement. Unilateral placement 
cases are discussed in detail in Section VII below, but briefly, courts apply a 
progressive three-prong approach to unilateral placement cases, determining: (1) 
whether the educational agency offered a FAPE; (2) if not, whether the parents’ 
placement was appropriate or proper; and (3) if so, whether equity warrants full, 
partial, or no reimbursement.174 
The analysis of whether a residential placement is educationally necessary for 
the purpose of determining a FAPE is almost identical to the analysis of whether a 
unilateral placement is appropriate (prong two). Cases about unilateral placement 
cite FAPE cases and FAPE cases cite unilateral placement cases.175 The only 
difference in most circuits—discussed in more detail below—is that in a unilateral 
placement cases, the placement does not need to comply perfectly with state 
educational standards.176 The author has not identified any decision noting that 
these are in fact separate types of cases nor one stating that courts nonetheless 
generally use the same analysis. 
The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have recently created tests that are 
ostensibly for unilateral placements. It is unclear how a residential placement 
FAPE case would be analyzed in those circuits, but given the similarity to the 
majority approach, it seems likely that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits would apply 
their unilateral test to a FAPE case, but the Tenth Circuit’s trajectory is less clear. 
A. Kruelle: The Majority Test  
The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of 
Columbia Circuits have all adopted the Third Circuit’s Kruelle test, which was 
based in part on North, a 1979 District of Columbia district court case. 
Ty North was educationally placed in a residential program following an 
administrative hearing, but was discharged “because the school could no longer 
deal with his emotional and other problems.”177 His parents—who could not 
control his behaviors—requested another residential placement, but the school 
 
173. See infra Part VII.B.2. 
174. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247–48 (2009). 
175. Compare e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 
2009) (quoting Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th 
Cir. 1990)—a FAPE case—in deciding a unilateral placement case), with Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 
627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Drew P. v. Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 
1989)—a unilateral placement case—in deciding a FAPE case). 
176. See infra Part VIII. 
177. North v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 138 (D.D.C. 1979). 
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district did nothing.178 When his parents refused to accept him, the residential 
placement staff transferred him to the custody of children’s services, which placed 
him in a mental health unit at a local hospital, and his parents filed against the 
district.179 The school district “vigorously argue[d] that plaintiff’s problems [were] 
emotional, social, and otherwise non-educational, and that they should not be 
saddled with the responsibility of providing him with living arrangements not 
strictly of an educational nature.”180 After hearing testimony, the court found that 
Ty’s “needs are so intimately intertwined that realistically it is not possible for the 
Court to perform the Solomon-like task of separating them” and awarded a 
preliminary injunction ordering the school district to fund residential placement.181 
Two years later, the Third Circuit applied similar analysis to determine that 
Paul Kruelle was entitled to a residential program in 1981.182 Paul had a profound 
intellectual disability with global developmental deficits; for example, he was 
unable to feed himself.183 At age ten, Paul was educationally placed in a residential 
program, but when his family moved to Delaware his new school district put him 
in a day program similar to an environment in which had previously failed him.184 
The Third Circuit focused on whether the placement “may be considered 
necessary for educational purposes, or whether the residential placement is a 
response to medical, social or emotional problems that are segregable from the 
learning process.”185 The “inextricability of medical and educational grounds for 
certain services,” its unseverability, “is the very basis for holding that the services 
are an essential prerequisite for learning.”186 
A decade later, the Ninth Circuit in Clovis adopted Kruelle and looked to 
whether a youth’s “placement may be considered necessary for educational 
purposes, or whether the placement [in a psychiatric facility] is a response to 
medical, social, or emotional problems that is necessary quite apart from the 
learning process.”187 Everyone agreed that placement at a residential program was 
educationally necessary for Michelle, and she was placed in a residential 
program.188 Her behaviors deteriorated while she was in a residential program to 
the point that she was transferred to a psychiatric hospital.189 Michelle’s program 




180. Id. at 140. 
181. Id. at 141. 
182. Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693–94 (3d. Cir. 1981). 
183. Id. at 688. 
184. Id. at 689. 
185. Id. at 693. 
186. Id. at 694. 
187. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
188. Id. at 639. 
189. Id. 
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educational programming she would receive on a given day.190 The educational 
services she received were not provided by the hospital, but by the local school 
district, which sent its own teachers in.191 The hospital was under the supervision 
of the California Department of Health Services, not the Department of 
Education.192 Applying Kruelle, it determined that Michelle’s hospitalization was a 
medical placement to address an “‘acute’ psychiatric crisis” rather than an 
educational placement.193 
While the exact language varies, a majority of circuits use the Third Circuit’s 
Kruelle segregability test.194 Unlike the Tatro test for related services focusing on the 
nature of the service, the key to the Kruelle inquiry is the purpose of the placement 
(though the nature of the placement is a part of that analysis as evidenced by 
Clovis). The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits diverge. 
B. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit analyzes whether the “primary orientation” of services is 
educational or not.195 Dale M. transferred into his school district at age fourteen, 
and “became a serious disciplinary problem.”196 The following year, he was placed 
in a therapeutic day school where he only attended twenty days in his first 
semester, though he did well when he was present.197 After his arrest and 
psychiatric hospitalization, Dale’s mother unilaterally placed him in a residential 
program.198 
The majority decision found that the residential placement was for the sole 
 
190. Id. at 645. 
191. Id. at 646. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 645. 
194. E.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C. ex rel. C.C., 258 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(“IDEA requires that a state pay for a disabled student’s residential placement if the student, because 
of his or her disability, cannot reasonably be anticipated to benefit from instruction without such a 
placement.” (citations omitted)); Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (“The fact that a residential placement may be required to alter a child’s regressive behavior 
at home as well as within the classroom, or is required due primarily to emotional problems, does not 
relieve the state of its obligation to pay for the program under federal law so long as it is necessary to 
insure that the child can be properly educated.”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., 915 
F.2d 651, 665 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he state must provide personalized instruction with sufficient 
support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” (citations 
omitted)); Burke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton ex rel. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 980 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(finding the child’s emotional challenges were “segregable” from his educational challenges where he 
performed well when he attended school); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693); Clevenger ex rel. Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 
516 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Richard’s main learning problem is his inability to cooperate with authority.”); 
Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[R]esidential placement was essential if 
Daniel was to receive the round-the-clock training he needed in order to make any educational 
progress.”). 
195. Dale M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Bd. of Educ., 237 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2001). 
196. Id. at 814. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
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purpose of “confinement” to “keep Dale out of jail” after having determined that 
the residential placement did not provide “psychological services” to Dale.199 On 
the one hand Dale clearly had “psychological problems that interfered with his 
obtaining an education,” but because he had “the intelligence to perform” and “no 
cognitive defect or disorder such as dyslexia” his problems were “not primarily 
educational.”200 
A vigorous dissent criticized Judge Posner for mischaracterizing the facts on 
record: “the program at Elan involves three separate components, life skills, 
counseling and class work. . . . [N]one of us who wear black robes are in an 
institutional position to second guess the Illinois Department of Education that 
approved the program as a permissible [educational] placement for Illinois school 
children.”201 Until residential placement was at issue, the school district agreed 
that Dale’s problems were related to his educational progress.202 
Thus, Dale M. ignored IDEA and proposed a very narrow view of 
educational benefit. If followed faithfully, the Seventh Circuit would likely only 
consider academic benefit—progress in reading, writing, math, and other core 
academic content—for all children except those with severe to profound 
developmental disabilities.203 Despite Judge Posner’s purported departure from 
longstanding precedent in other circuits, district courts in the Seventh Circuit 
continue to essentially apply the Kruelle standard.204 
C. The Fifth Circuit 
The leading Fifth Circuit case, Michael Z., was a unilateral placement case and 
the Fifth Circuit took care to describe the test it articulated as applying specifically 
 
199. Id. at 817 (“[T]he Elan School does not provide psychological services, at least to Dale. 
For him all it provides is confinement. . . . Elan is a jail substitute.”). 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 819. 
202. Id. 
203. See id. 
204. E.g., Memorandum Opinion & Order at 8, Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., No. 
13-02782, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142134, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2013) (upholding 
reimbursement where “drug treatment services they provided W.E. were incidental to, and enabled 
him to benefit from, their academic programs”); Report & Recommendation Motions for Summary 
Judgment & Sanctions at 14, Mount Vernon Sch. Corp. v. A.M. ex rel. Maier, No. 11-00637, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 122918, at *23, *32–33 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 10, 2012) (magistrate judge quoting discussion of 
Kruelle, 642 F.2d 687, in Dale M., 237 F.3d at 817, 818, and applying the “segregable” standard in 
recommending upholding an administrative placement at a residential program), adopted by Entry on 
Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report & Entry on Case Management, Mount Vernon Sch. Corp. v. 
A.M., No. 11-00637, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122915 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 29, 2012); Memorandum 
Opinion & Order at 10, Aaron M. ex rel, Glen M. v. Yomtoob, No. 00-07732, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21252, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2003) (explaining that Dale M., 237 F.3d at 813, “merely confirms” 
that parents who unilaterally place their children bear the financial risk of that placement in denying a 
school district’s request to be reimbursed for expenses that were overturned on appeal). But see 
Decision & Order, Hjortness ex rel. Hjortness v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., Nos. 05-00648, 05-00656, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43642 (E.D. Wis. Jun. 27, 2006) (denying reimbursement where procedural 
errors did not significantly impede the parents’ participation in the IEP process). 
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to unilateral placements.205 In Michael Z., the Fifth Circuit rejected the Kruelle 
approach, contending—without referring to IDEA’s extensive provisions 
regarding functional needs—that Kruelle “expands school district liability beyond 
that required by IDEA.”206 Instead, the Fifth Circuit in Michael Z. set forth a two-
prong test asking whether (1) the residential placement was essential in order for 
the disabled child to receive a meaningful educational benefit, and (2) it was 
primarily oriented toward enabling the child to obtain an education.207 
A concurring opinion questioned whether this new test was in fact distinct 
from Kruelle.208 “Though linguistically obtuse, Kruelle essentially asks a 
straightforward question: Does the child, because of her disability, require a 
residential placement to obtain the meaningful benefit to which she is entitled?”209 
This test is discussed in detail below in Section VII.B.1. It is unclear whether the 
Fifth Circuit would analyze a FAPE residential placement case under its usual 
four-prong Michael F. test for FAPE210 or whether it would use the first prong of 
its new Michael Z. test. Based on the similarities noted by the concurrence, there 
should not be a significant difference in the Fifth Circuit from the majority 
approach, but at least one district court has interpreted Michael Z. to impose a very 
strict definition of education as academic.211 
D. The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the approaches discussed above and rejected 
them.212 Its analysis focused heavily on the unilateral placement aspect of that 
case.213 But because it clearly and forcefully rejected Kruelle’s segregability test, it is 
unclear how the Tenth Circuit would now analyze a residential-placement FAPE 
case. Of the circuits, the Tenth Circuit is the furthest from the majority. The case 
is discussed in detail below. 
VII. UNILATERAL PLACEMENT CASES: REQUESTS FOR REIMBURSEMENT  
In unilateral placement cases, parents place their child in a private program 
without the consent of or referral by their school district and then seek 
reimbursement from the district. 
 
205. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z. ex rel. Leah Z., 580 F.3d 286, 298 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
206. Id. at 299. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 303. 
209. Id. at 303 (Prado, J., concurring). 
210. Id. at 293–94 (discussing Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. ex rel. Barry 
F., 118 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
211. R.C. ex rel. S.K. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 2d 718 (N.D. Tex. 2013), 
discussed in Part VII.B.1, infra. 
212. See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1232–37 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
213. Id. at 1235–39. 
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Both conceptually and functionally, courts apply the three-prong approach 
recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Forest Grove to unilateral placement 
cases, determining: (1) whether the educational agency offered a FAPE; (2) if not, 
whether the parents’ placement was appropriate or proper; and (3) if so, whether 
equity warrants full, partial, or no reimbursement.214 But in name, courts call this a 
two-prong test (whether the district failed to offer a FAPE and whether the 
placement is appropriate), after which the equities are balanced.215 Regardless, this 
test is consecutive and dispositive. If the educational agency offered a FAPE, the 
parent’s claim fails and the inquiry ends. 
The right to reimbursement for unilateral placements was initially created by 
courts interpreting their statutory authority to “grant such relief as [it] determines 
is appropriate” in resolving special education disputes.216 Congress subsequently 
created rules relating to the right to reimbursement for unilateral placements, 
tacitly endorsing Burlington and its progeny.217 
As with residential program law generally, unilateral placement decisions are 
not always clear in their analysis. Many cases conflate the first two prongs, 
discussing denial of FAPE hand-in-hand with the appropriateness of the parent’s 
placement.218 Other cases barely articulate any overall test and instead review 
specific elements.219 But these are often important cases, so the author has put 
them where they fit best. 
Very few families can afford the cost of placement at a residential program, 
so unilateral placement as it is most commonly executed—the parent paying out 
of pocket—is available only to a narrow portion of the population. But unilateral 
placement law is important for all practitioners regardless of the socioeconomic 
status of one’s clients because in some cases an agency may seek reimbursement 
for a noneducational residential placement from the caregiver of a family. In such 
 
214. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009). 
215. See, e.g., R.L. ex rel. O.L. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., No 12-14880, 2014 WL 3031231, 
at *5 (11th Cir. July 2, 2014) (articulating the relevant test in a unilateral placement case as a two-step 
analysis followed by an equitable determination of appropriate relief). 
216. Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1985) (quoting then-section 
1415(e)(2) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975); see also Florence Cnty. Sch. 
Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12–14, (1993) (clarifying that School Committee, 471 U.S. 
at 359, does not require parents to follow all of IDEA’s procedures). 
217. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 239–45, 247 (discussing IDEA’s 1997 amendments and 
their tacit endorsement of School Committee, 471 U.S. at 370, and Carter, 510 U.S. at 7); see also Ralph D. 
Mawdsley, Diminished Rights of Parents to Seek Reimbursement Under IDEA for Unilateral Placement of Their 
Children in Private Schools, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 303, 305–11 (2012) (discussing the development of 
unilateral placement law). 
218. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., No 1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500–02 (9th Cir. 1996). 
219. See, e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d 1175, 1183–86 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
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a case, the family may be able to shift liability to the school district, as the 
following families did.220 
M.M. was a young woman whose anxiety was so severe that she “would 
become overwhelmed by her surroundings, leading to regressive behavior and an 
inability ‘to problem solve effectively or to think clearly and logically.’”221 Her 
clinical social worker recommended a residential placement, but her school district 
refused to offer a residential placement.222 Instead, the district advised M.M.’s 
mother to turn her over to the foster-care system.223 While the placement was 
pending, M.M.’s father died.224 With no alternative, Mrs. B. gave M.M. over to the 
foster-care system to achieve residential placement, but then that system took the 
proceeds from the father’s life insurance policy from this new widow to pay for 
the placement.225 The Second Circuit affirmed a district court order finding that 
M.M.’s placement should have been funded by her school district.226 
This is not the only case in which a school district has forced parents to 
relinquish their children to foster care because the district refused to pay for a 
residential program. In Christopher T., San Francisco Unified School District forced 
at least two families to do exactly this.227 Citing Kruelle, the Northern District of 
California not only ordered prospective placement for both youth, but it also 
ordered the district to reimburse both the parents and the foster care system for 
the costs it incurred implementing the placement that should have been provided 
by the district.228 
A. If the Educational Agency Offered a FAPE, then  
Reimbursement is Not Available 
Educational agencies enjoy a “safe harbor” from reimbursement claims if 
they make “a FAPE available by correctly identifying a child as having a disability 
and proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child’s needs.”229 However, “IDEA 
does not require [a student] to spend years in an educational environment likely to 
be inadequate and to impede her progress simply to permit the School District to 
try every option short of residential placement.”230 This prong of analysis 
 
220. E.g., E.M. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 461 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that 
a parent who has not yet paid for the unilateral placement has standing because of a contractual 
obligation to pay tuition). 
221. Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1117 (2d Cir. 1997). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 1117–18. 
225. Id. at 1118. 
226. Id. at 1122. 
227. Christopher T. ex rel. Brogna v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (N.D. 
Cal. 1982). 
228. Id. at 1120–21. 
229. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 241 (2009). 
230. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations 
omitted). 
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essentially applies Rowley’s examination of substantive and procedural compliance 
to the district’s offer of a FAPE. 
First, an educational agency must meet its child-find duty to identify, locate, 
and evaluate the child for special education regardless of whether the child has 
previously attended public schools.231 Merely having child-find procedures in place 
is not sufficient when a local educational agency “unreasonably fail[s] to identify a 
child with disabilities” because Congress placed “paramount importance [on] 
properly identifying each child eligible for services.”232 
Next, an educational agency must timely complete its evaluations.233 The 
school district in Tice conceded that it failed to timely assess Matthew and the 
Fourth Circuit found that the “six-month delay directly resulted in there being no 
IEP in place at the time of” the unilateral placement.234 If the educational agency 
is prevented from completing evaluations, however, relief may be denied under 
the equities analysis discussed below.235 
The educational agency must find the child eligible for special education.236 
But if a child is not in fact eligible for special education, then an educational 
agency’s failure to find, identify, and evaluate the child does not deny that child a 
FAPE and the inquiry ends.237 
After evaluating and determining eligibility, the educational agency then must 
make an offer of a FAPE.238 This offer must be procedurally correct.239 In 
refusing to consider a school district’s “post hoc rationalization,” the Fourth 
Circuit in Tice declared that where no IEP was offered, “no professional decision 
had been made to which deference was due.”240 Without clearly discussing the 
 
231. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 245; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2012) (stating 
that the child-find requirement extends to “[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the State, 
including children with disabilities . . . attending private schools”). 
232. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 245. 
233. See Tice ex rel. Tice v. Botetourt Cnty. Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200, 1206–07 (4th Cir. 1990). 
234. Id. While the express holding of Tice, applying a strict liability standard to a procedural 
error, has been superseded by statute, Tice remains reliable because the Fourth Circuit discussed how 
the delay in assessment resulted in the child not being served, which is similar to the “impede the 
right to a FAPE” prong of the current harmless error test. 
235. See, e.g., Patricia P. ex rel. Jacob P. v. Bd. of Educ., 203 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“[P]arents who . . . do not allow a school district a reasonable opportunity to evaluate their disabled 
child, forfeit their claim for reimbursement . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
236. See Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(explaining that whether a student is disabled such that he or she is eligible for special education 
under IDEA is “determined by the individual school district in accordance with state law”). 
237. See Maus ex rel. K.M. v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294–98 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that a student with social disabilities that did not impair her educational 
performance was not eligible for special education services under IDEA and thus procedural 
violations by the district’s committee on special education did not deny her a FAPE). 
238. See Tice, 908 F.2d at 1208 (finding that a school district’s failure to provide timely 
evaluations of a child identified as disabled was a procedural error that amounted to a failure to 
provide the child a FAPE as required by IDEA). 
239. Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The Supreme Court has 
explained the great importance of . . . procedural components of IDEA.”). 
240. Tice, 908 F.2d at 1208. 
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underlying facts, the Ninth Circuit in Union similarly emphasized the importance 
of the written offer because the purpose of prior written notice requirement is “to 
eliminate troublesome factual disputes many years later about when placements 
were offered, what placements were offered, and what additional” services were 
offered.241 Failure to make a written offer prevents the parents from being able to 
make a decision whether to accept or oppose the offer.242 In sum, “a school 
district’s failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious” a failure to 
offer an appropriate IEP.243 
The purported offer of a FAPE must address the known needs of a child.244 
In Seattle, the Ninth Circuit considered a former foster youth with a long history of 
emotional and behavior challenges, including diagnosed attachment disorder and a 
personality disorder.245 Though she was “exceptionally bright,” she was 
“deteriorating” academically “unable to make productive use of what she 
learned.”246 The school district evaluated her when she was eight, but found her 
ineligible for special education.247 She was so disruptive to her peers that “the 
School District had even expelled her” when she was just ten.248 The district 
reevaluated her five months after expelling her and found her eligible, but 
recommended a school-based program despite a number of clinicians 
recommending residential placement.249 The Ninth Circuit ordered the school to 
fund a residential program, holding that the educational agency was not allowed to 
keep her in an inadequate environment simply “to try every option short of 
residential placement.”250 
Similarly in Mrs. B., the child had anxiety such that she “would become 
overwhelmed by her surroundings, leading to regressive behavior and an inability 
‘to problem solve effectively or to think clearly and logically.’”251 Even her 
teachers remarked that the child was “not producing or learning in our 
program.”252 She failed to meet “nearly all” of her IEP objectives and “over the 
course of three years, despite being of average to slightly below-average 
 
241. Union Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 1526. 
242. Id. The Union School District case, like the Fourth Circuit’s 1990 decision in Tice, appears at 
a glance to provide a strict error analysis to procedural FAPE claims, even though the Ninth Circuit 
had two years earlier shifted toward a harmless error test in W.G. ex rel. R.G. v. Board of Trustees, 960 
F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, Union School District is likely reliable on this point because 
although it does not expressly articulate harm, it discusses how the failure to make a formal written 
offer prevents the parents from participating in the IEP process. Union Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 1526. 
243. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238–39 (2009). 
244. Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1115–16 (2d Cir. 1997). 
245. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S. ex rel. A.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1497–98 (9th Cir. 1996). 
246. Id. at 1500–01. 
247. Id. at 1497. 
248. Id. at 1500. 
249. Id. at 1497–98. 
250. Id. at 1501. 
251. Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1117 (quoting the child’s psychological report from the Yale Child 
Study Center). 
252. Id. at 1117. 
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intelligence, [she] did not advance more than one grade level in any subject.”253 
The school district denied her a FAPE when it knew her emotional and behavioral 
challenges were impeding her ability to access an education, but “offered no plan 
to deal with her worsening behavior.”254 
When a child has already attended the school’s placement or a similar 
placement, the court should look to actual progress in that environment.255 The 
court should examine both the academic and nonacademic educational benefit—
or lack thereof—from the proposed placement.256 This FAPE analysis of actual 
progress accords with common substantive FAPE analysis in which courts 
sometimes limit their inquiry about the offer to what was known at the time of the 
IEP team meeting.257 If the educational agency failed to offer a FAPE, the court 
moves on to consider the appropriateness of the parent’s unilateral placement. 
B. Appropriateness of the Placement 
As discussed above, the analysis of whether a residential placement is 
educationally necessary for the purpose of determining a FAPE is the same in 
most circuits as the analysis of whether a parent’s unilateral placement is 
appropriate (prong two).258 The key difference is that a unilateral placement does 
not have to comport with all of the requirements of IDEA.259 In Carter, the 
Supreme Court expressly stated that a unilateral placement does not have to be 
certified by the state educational agency.260 “IDEA was intended to ensure that 
children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free”; to 
deny children a free appropriate education because their parents did not follow the 
same procedures prescribed for school districts “would defeat this statutory 
purpose.”261 State educational agency certification is regularly a factor considered 
in determining appropriateness.262 
 
253. Id. at 1121. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 1120–21; Seattle Sch. Dist., 82 F.3d at 1500 (applying Sacramento City Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Rachel H. ex rel. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
256. Seattle Sch. Dist., 82 F.3d at 1500. 
257. Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n IEP must take into 
account what was, and was not, objectively reasonable when the snapshot was taken, that is, at the 
time the IEP was drafted.” (quoting Fuhrmann ex rel. Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 
F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 1993))). 
258. Compare Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing a 
unilateral placement case to decide a FAPE case), with Ashland Sch Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 
587 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing a FAPE case to decide a unilateral placement case); compare 
Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 697 (3d Cir. 1981) (non-unilateral), with Mary T. 
v. Sch. Dist., 575 F.3d 235, 246–48 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 690–92, in a unilateral 
placement case). 
259. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993). 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 13. 
262. See, e.g., Manchester-Essex Reg’l Sch. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of 
Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (D. Mass 2007). 
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Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have recently confirmed that for 
reimbursement “parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service 
necessary to maximize their child’s potential.”263 But the Tenth Circuit ignores the 
Supreme Court on this point and requires that the placement be state certified as 
described below.264 If the educational agency failed to offer a FAPE and the 
parent’s unilateral placement is appropriate, then most circuits move on to 
consider the equities. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits are exceptions. 
1. The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit ostensibly departs from Kruelle, though it is not yet clear to 
what extent that departure is meaningful. Shortly after Forest Grove, the Fifth 
Circuit set forth a two-prong test to determine whether a unilateral residential 
placement is appropriate, asking whether (1) the residential placement was 
essential in order for the disabled child to receive a meaningful educational 
benefit, and (2) it was primarily oriented toward enabling the child to obtain an 
education.265 Even if the parent survives this inquiry, the court is then to “weed 
out inappropriate treatments from the appropriate (and therefore reimburseable) 
ones.”266 
Leah Z. was a young woman with multiple mental and developmental 
disabilities whose chief behavior problem in high school was frequently leaving 
class during which time she would engage in a variety of maladaptive behaviors.267 
In the middle of ninth grade, her school district transferred her to another school, 
but the teacher assigned to that class was on parenting leave and the district hired 
an uncertified teacher to staff the class who they failed to inform of Leah’s 
primary issue of fleeing class.268 After just two weeks in this classroom, she 
became so violent at home that her psychiatrist recommended admission to a 
residential program and the parents promptly placed her in it.269 Two months into 
this placement, the school district held an IEP team meeting at which it refused to 
offer residential placement and instead offered essentially the same program that 
had already failed Leah.270 
In examining Kruelle and its progeny, the Fifth Circuit expressed concern—
echoing North from thirty years prior—that “[b]y requiring courts to undertake the 
Solomonic task of determining when a child’s medical, social, and emotional 
 
263. C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 
2011) (quoting Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 356 (2d Cir. 2006)); Frank 
G., 459 F.3d at 365 (citing M.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
264. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1238–39 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
265. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z. ex rel. Leah Z., 580 F.3d 286, 300 (2009). 
266. Id. at 301. 
267. Id. at 289–90. 
268. Id. at 290. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 291. 
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problems are segregable from education, Kruelle expands school district liability 
beyond that required by IDEA.”271 The Fifth Circuit found that the IEP was 
clearly inappropriate.272 Applying its new test, the district court’s findings below 
established that residential placement was essential for Leah to receive educational 
benefit but the Fifth Circuit remanded for findings on whether the placement was 
primarily educationally oriented.273 In a concurring opinion, Judge Edward Prado 
did “not interpret our two-part test for the propriety of a residential placement as 
departing from that of the other circuits that have addressed this issue.”274 He 
noted that while the Fifth Circuit’s second prong is not expressly in the Kruelle test, 
courts applying Kruelle “have instead gone on to determine whether the particular 
placement for which the parents are asking to be reimbursed is itself proper.”275 
At least one district court in the Fifth Circuit has followed Michael Z.’s dicta 
regarding the limiting liability of districts for only academic services.276 R.C. was a 
high school student with varying diagnoses, including bipolar disorder, anxiety 
disorder, ADHD, and Asperger’s syndrome.277 R.C. was absent for much of the 
second semester of eleventh grade due to school-based anxiety causing him to fail 
several classes.278 He was placed in a residential program for approximately four 
months, returned home briefly, and then was unilaterally placed at a second 
residential program after which his parents requested reimbursement.279 A district 
court judge felt that R.C.’s parents’ representation that he had failed eleventh 
grade was “misleading” because of R.C.’s “excessive absence” from school that 
year.280 While the court was “concerned about plaintiff’s having to be admitted to 
residential facilities and psychiatric programs, . . . the core of the IDEA is to 
provide access to educational opportunities.”281 Because R.C. was successful when 
he was able to attend school, the court disregarded his allegation that he was 
unable to attend school for significant periods of time due to his disability.282 The 
court ignored the core argument that R.C.’s anxiety prevented him from accessing 
educational opportunities. 
After conducting an “analysis of the services as a whole,” but before 
balancing the equities, courts “must then examine each constituent part of the 
placement to weed out inappropriate treatments from the appropriate (and 
 
271. Id. at 299. 
272. Id. at 295. 
273. Id. at 301. 
274. Id. at 302. 
275. Id. at 303. 
276. R.C. ex rel. S.K. & D.H. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 2d 718 (N.D. Tex. 
2013). 
277. Id. at 723–24. 
278. Id. at 736. 
279. Id. at 728–29. 
280. Id. at 736. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
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therefore reimburseable) ones.”283 Because Michael Z. was remanded and no 
published opinion has applied this aspect of the test, it is unclear how this weeding 
out would be applied and how it interacts with the Fifth Circuit’s concern over the 
difficulty of the “Solomonic task” of disaggregating services that are essential for 
education from those that are not. It may operate similar to Tatro—looking to the 
nature of the services themselves (whereas the focus of the first part of the Michael 
Z. analysis is the purpose of the placement). 
2. The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit in Jefferson recently reviewed the varying approaches to 
appropriateness described in Section VI and invented its own test. 284 Applying a 
selective reading of IDEA, the Tenth Circuit analyzes whether (1) the school 
district provided a FAPE, (2) the residential placement is accredited in its state, (3) 
the residential placement provided specially designed instruction to meet the 
unique needs of the child, and (4) any additional services are related services 
intended to support education.285 This Jefferson four-prong test takes the place of 
the first and second prongs of the Burlington-Forest Grove test to determine the 
appropriateness of a parent’s choice of residential placement in unilateral 
placement cases.286 
Elizabeth E. was attending a private day school for children with disabilities 
pursuant to a settlement agreement when she was psychiatrically hospitalized for 
assessment purposes.287 The school district had a separate agreement with the 
private school that the school would refund the school district for days Elizabeth 
did not attend.288 But the district withdrew Elizabeth from the private school 
because she was in the hospital.289 The school district then asserted that Elizabeth 
was no longer even a student of the school district—allegedly mooting the 
settlement agreement.290 The parents informed the school district that they were 
transitioning Elizabeth to a residential program out of state and requested an IEP 
team meeting to discuss the change.291 The school district refused to engage in any 
meaningful discussion.292 The parents filed for due process, requesting that the 
school district fund a residential program for Elizabeth and at every level—
 
283. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z. ex rel. Leah Z., 580 F.3d 286, 301 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
284. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1236–38 
(10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013). In its unsuccessful petition for certiorari, Jefferson 
County School District argued that this test was actually more favorable for parents. Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, 2012 U.S. Briefs 1175, at 11 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013), 2013 WL 1247971, at *11. 
285. Elizabeth E., 702 F.3d at 1236–37. 
286. Id. at 1232–33. 
287. Id. at 1230. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 1230–31. 
291. Id. at 1231. 
292. See id. 
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administrative, district court, and court of appeals—the school district only 
challenged the appropriateness of Elizabeth’s placement, conceding its denial of a 
FAPE.293 
While it appears to have achieved the correct result for Elizabeth E., the 
Tenth Circuit’s new approach is problematic on at least two levels. First, Jefferson’s 
second prong goes against two decades of precedent that parents need not meet 
IDEA’s procedural requirements such as accreditation,294 despite the Supreme 
Court’s recent affirmation that Carter is still good law,295 and current regulations 
confirming that.296 Second, Jefferson’s fourth prong may also go awry of Carter 
inasmuch as it requires parents to exercise a level of expertise in determining what 
services are educationally necessary. That expertise is supposed to be provided by 
the school district in the first instance: “[t]his is IDEA’s mandate, and school 
officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.”297 When 
their child is denied a FAPE and parents place him or her in a substantively 
appropriate placement at their own expense, “it would be an empty victory to 
have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these 
expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials.”298 
Jefferson has not yet been applied within the Tenth Circuit, so it remains to be 
seen what actual impact this will have on families.299 
C. Balancing the Equities 
An undercurrent of equity flows through the entire body of reimbursement 
cases. In 1985, Burlington started from the question of whether parents should be 
reimbursed when they avoided the IEP process.300 In 1993, Carter laid this out 
even more clearly, noting that under IDEA “[c]ourts fashioning discretionary 
equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the 
appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required.”301 
Then in its 1997 reauthorization of IDEA, when Congress codified the 
authority for reimbursement, it also included equitable considerations.302 First, 
 
293. Id. at 1231–32. 
294. Compare id. at 1237, with Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 
14 (1993) (“Parents’ failure to select a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an 
unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement.”). 
295. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009). 
296. 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2014). 
297. Carter, 510 U.S. at 14. 
298. Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1985). 
299. Only one case to date cites Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 for a general proposition. M.S. ex 
rel. J.S. v. Utah Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, No. 2:13-cv-420 TS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118942, at *8, 
n.9 (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2014) (quoting Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 702 F.3d at 1229) (“IDEA provides 
federal funding to states to assist with the education of disabled children on the condition that states 
comply with the Act’s ‘extensive goals and procedures.’”). 
300. Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 372. 
301. Carter, 510 U.S. at 16. 
302. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii–iv) (2012). 
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Congress allowed reduction or denial of reimbursement when a parent either (1) 
failed to state their concerns that the IEP team meeting prior to removal or (2) 
failed to provide written notice ten business days in advance.303 In 2009, Forest 
Grove reiterated that courts may broadly exercise “discretion to reduce the amount 
of a reimbursement award if the equities so warrant.”304 Courts exercise this 
“broad discretion” to achieve different results under similar circumstances.305 
Failure to present a child for evaluation will generally bar reimbursement.306 
Patricia P. placed her son in a parochial school for his first year of high school.307 
When he was not allowed to return she nominally enrolled him in her local school 
but within two weeks unilaterally placed him in an out-of-state residential program 
with no notice.308 She filed for administrative due process, seeking reimbursement 
less than six weeks later.309 Over the next three years, her “sole action evidencing a 
willingness to avail her son for evaluation . . . was her offering to allow School 
District staff to travel [from Illinois] to Maine to evaluate” him at the residential 
program.310 The Seventh Circuit denied reimbursement on the equities because 
Patricia P. failed to make a “genuine” effort to give the district a “reasonable 
opportunity” to evaluate her son.311 But it cautioned that school districts would be 
held to the same standard: “this Court will look harshly upon any party’s failure to 
reasonably cooperate with another’s diligent” attempts to comply with IDEA.312 
But a New York district court found “no showing that [the parents] acted 
unreasonably” in a similar case where the parents did not bring their residentially 
placed child back in state to proffer him for evaluation.313 The Eschanasys first 
requested a special education evaluation in the spring of their son’s eleventh grade 
year, but then unilaterally placed him in a residential program before the district 
could complete its evaluation.314 For over three months, the school district 
requested the parents either to present their son for evaluation or at least provide 
copies of the evaluations conducted at the residential program;315 the parents did 
not.316 After finding that he was substantively denied a FAPE317 and that one of 
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the unilateral placements was appropriate, the court found “no showing [that the 
parents] acted unreasonably under the circumstances” and awarded full 
reimbursement for the appropriate placement.318 
Still there are some general guidelines for evaluating equities beyond the 
importance of presenting the child for evaluation. Though not required, parents 
should provide written notice or state their concerns at an IEP team meeting prior 
to unilaterally placing their child per the plain language of IDEA.319 When filling 
out application papers to a placement, they should carefully, clearly, and 
voluminously express their educational concerns.320 Parents should act before sex 
and drugs become a concern—in an appeal of the remand from Forest Grove, the 
Ninth Circuit used such evidence in the equities phase to deny reimbursement 
even though the child was denied a FAPE and the placement was appropriate.321 
Parents should be prepared to prove that school district officials have acted 
unreasonably to overcome the presumption in some circuits that school officials 
“are properly performing their obligations under IDEA.”322 On the other hand, 
parents must be mindful of their own subjective reasons for requesting residential 
placement: in a subsequent appeal in Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
“contention that, as a matter of law, his parents’ subjective reasons for private 
school enrollment cannot be a valid equitable consideration.”323 
Further, if a district has provided English-speaking, literate parents with a 
generic statement of parental rights that contains notice of their right to seek 
reimbursement, the parents cannot rely on the district’s failure to specifically 
notify them of this right.324 
Essentially, if the district is perceived as trying at all to work with the parents, 
the parents must prove their own good-faith attempt to cooperate.325 While the 
overwhelming majority of cases seriously considering the equities go at least in 
part against the parents, courts do occasionally find against a school district, even 
where the parent is arguably partially to blame.326 
VIII. COMMONALITIES AMONG THE CIRCUIT TESTS 
Of course, whenever possible, advocacy for youth with mental illness should 
start well before the child needs a residential program. In most of the residential 
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placement cases in which parents won, the child’s mental illness had been 
unaddressed or underaddressed for years. The author’s own experience is that 
early and intensive interventions can often prevent the need for residential 
placement. But attorneys do not always meet our clients in time to engage in early 
advocacy. 
When read as a whole, the circuits—except the Tenth Circuit—apply similar 
analyses to residential placement cases. Though the wording changes, the majority 
look to whether the purpose of the placement is educational—necessary, primarily 
educational, insegregably educational, essential for educational purposes, primarily 
oriented toward enabling education. The careful attorney will be mindful, 
however, to articulate the nuanced differences when citing cross circuit authority 
to link facts to their home circuit’s test. 
For the most part cases requesting residential placement for a FAPE are 
reliable in unilateral placement cases and vice versa. In all but the Tenth Circuit, 
the analysis for appropriateness in FAPE cases is identical to the analysis of 
appropriateness for unilateral placement cases under the second prong of Forest 
Grove. 
The key challenge in residential placement cases is establishing the ongoing 
link between a child’s mental illness and the child’s inability to access an 
education, especially when the symptoms prevent them from consistently 
attending school. IDEA was established to give all children with disabilities access 
to an education. Congress sought to ensure access to those children whose 
disabilities were so severe that they were unable or not allowed to attend school. 
In most circuits, children with developmental disabilities should still have 
access to residential placements when necessary. But as the circuits move further 
away from IDEA’s combined focus on academic and functional performance and 
increasingly impose their own ideas of what education is, it has become more 
difficult to obtain residential placement for youth with mental illness. 
 
